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Politics has always been closely bound up with history, which in turn has 
often been used for political purposes.' History is currently playing an 
important political role in many different societies. Where the shaping of a 
national identity remains a problem or where old conflicts still linger, 
setting peoples or nations against one another, it occupies the centre of 
political debate and serves to justify a wide variety of actions and opinions. 
But even where there are no such problems, history is strengthening its lies 
with politics. Historians, or at least some of them, are beginning to become 
known for their repeated appearance in the media when it comes to matters 
of internal or international politics. A considerable number of history hooks 
and memoirs and publications of a popularizing nature reveal clear political 
motivation, not to mention the debates that they provoke. But it is 
undoubtedly in commemorations that the increasing politicization of history 
is seen most clearly. Historical commemorations sponsored hy a wide range 
of governments follow hard on each other's heels. 
In Spain, 1998 was the year of commemorations par exce/le11ce, just as 
1995 had been in the countries that celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of 
the end of World War II. Spain had not taken part in that war - although 
the then recently established dictatorship of Franco had shown that it 
favoured Nazi Germany and Mussolini's regime - and was therefore in no 
position to recall the defeat of fascism, but in 1998 it was faced with a 
very special occasion. Several commemorations coincided that year. The 
first was the centenary of Spain's military defeat at the hands of the 
United States in the Spanish-American War, which brought about the loss 
of the last remnants of the colonial empire in America and the Pacific 
islands. In 1898 that empire disappeared completely, plunging Spain into 
a 'decline' against which a reaction came from a group of intellectuals -
the so-called Generation of '98 - who were highly critical of the political 
system of the monarchy of the time. This was in a way an awkward, 
inopportune commemoration for the current rulers, but in the same year 
another commemoration came to their aid: the quarter centenary of the 
end of the extremely long reign of Philip IT, the king who raised the 
Spanish empire to its highest point in Europe and America. Also in 1998, 
the democratic constitution that governs the current political system 
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celebrated its twentieth anniversary, something without precedent in the 
entire history of Spain. 
These are not the only historical dates lo have been specially 
commemorated in Spain during the past decade. Going back to the 
Socialist period, in 1988 there was the celebration of the bicentenary of 
the death of Charles m, a moment used for officia l exalta ti on of the 
reformi st work of the very moderate enlightened Spaniards, contrasting 
with the sli ght interest aroused a year la ter by the bicente nary of the 
Fre nch Re volution. In the same year, 1988, the nationalist autonomous 
government of Catalonia rromoted the celebration of the 'millennium of 
the Catalan nation ' , and in 1992 it placed special emphasis on the 
centenary of the Bases de Manresa , representec.1 as the o rigin of modern 
ro litical Catalanism. None of those events came anywhere near achieving 
the impact of the great commemoration par excelle11ce, the quincentenary 
of the 'discovery' o f America, promoted in th is case by the national 
government at the height of the Socialist era. Jn the 1990s there were also 
commemorations of less substance anc.1 without much official support 
which did not penetrate deeply into public opinion but served to recall , for 
example, the figure of the dictator Franco I 00 years after h is bi rth ( 1992), 
anc.1 the completion of 20 years since the beginning of the transition to 
democracy ( 1995) and 60 years since the start of the C ivil War (I 996). In 
1997, wi th the right-wing government of the Popular Party having 
recently assumed power, o fficial interest in historical commemorati ons 
became ·apparent once again. The reason that year was the centenary of the 
assassination of the Conservative leader Antonio Canovas dcl Castillo, the 
architect in 1874 of the restoration of the monarchy and the consolidation 
in Spain of a moderately liberal parliamentary regime that , nevertheless, 
subsequently r rovec.1 incapable of evolving towarc.ls tru e democracy. 
Immediately afterwards came I 998, as no ted , and the commemoration of 
the 100 years since the colonial 'disaster' and 400 years s ince Philip II 's 
death. 
The commemorations just mentioned are examples of a new ki nd of 
political use of history. Today the myths cultivated by national/Catholic 
fu ndamentalism have become things of the past, as has the ideological 
combat that conditioned the development of Spanish histo riography for 
most of the twentieth century. T be new political uses of history are of a 
different kind. Most often they have the support of hi storians and an 
academic backing tbat makes them professionally ' respectable ' . Criticisms 
of the motivation for these institutional initiatives ra rely achieve public 
notice. The installation of democracy led to a weakening of the old myths 
and great ideologies against the background of which a tradition of 
'scientific histo ry ' had laboriously been created. Politically committed 
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academic activity began to be abandoned, and mosl professional historians 
attached a high value to the cultivation of aseptic monographs and 
professional debate among specialists as natural elements of their work. In 
many cases this attitude then became compatible with an evident sense of 
pleasure in initiatives of an institutional nature that presented the 
appearance of 'scientific professionalism'. The social impact of these 
initiatives conferred on history a usefulness all the more appreciable as the 
weight of the old discipline in our current educational system diminished. 
At the same time, history increasingly became a target of political 
exploitation, although in a new way. 
The politics of history in Spain at present cannot simply be reduced to 
the conntry's intense involvement in official commemorations during the 
past decade. In a quite different context we must also refer to the role 
played by legal proceedings of international scope such as those that 
elucidated the participation of Franco's government and ceriain Spaniards 
close to it in the plundering of Jews during World War II , or magistrate 
Baltasar Garzon's action against Pinochel for his responsibility in 
connection with the lorture and murder of Spanish citizens, among others, 
in Chile after the military coup against Salvador Allende's democratic 
government. There has also been a very significant response in the media 
to certain polemics, such as those focusing on the nature of the Franco 
regime and its similarities and differences with respect to fascism,1 the 
pros and cons of a transition not as exemplary as we had been led to 
believe, ' and. recently, the controversy over the role of certain o utstanding 
intellectuals in the 1940s. supporters of the dictatorship at the time and 
later outstanding points of reference in the opposition to it.' The 
educational function of history has become the subject of intense political 
dÉbaíÉKú=and two university events have evoked politically uncomfortable 
memories: the reception and tribute given to survivors of the International 
Brigades in the auditorium of the University of Valencia and the 
conference on the Maquis (the Republican guerrilla forces that continued 
armed resistance against Franco 's dictatorship after the end of the Civil 
War) also organized within that university. 
The political role currently played by history in Spain is not comparable 
to the part it played in the time of Franco's dictatorship, but equally it 
contrasts with the silence and forgetfulness promoted during the transition 
to democracy by political 111ea11s (parties, government) and for political 
purposes (to help to bring about a peaceful transition from dictatorship to 
democracy after Franco's death in 1975). The desire to achieve a peaceful 
solution supported by a broad consensus made certain questions about the 
past awkward. The political climate of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
tended to favour forgetfulness with the aim of encouraging concord and 
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reconciliation among Spaniards. The transition to democracy was 
accompanied by fear of remembering the immediate past; the future counted 
more than a history full of failures which some might use as weapons 
against others. Directly or indirectly, the great catastrophe of the Civil War 
continued to weigh upon the conscience of most Spaniards. However, as 
democracy became established and the intensity of the changes turned 
Spaniards away from fratricidal conflict and as those who had lived through 
the Civil War moved out of the public eye or disappeared, the amnesia 
ceased to have the political meaning conferred upon it by the 'agreed-upon' 
transition to democracy. In the new atmosphere of the late 1990s we begin 
to see signs of a personal and collective need to recover the past in a 
different way, far removed from the commonplaces promoted by the old 
ideologies and from the oblivion that falsely closed the wounds of the past 
during the transition. 
THE POLITICS OF HISTORY AND NAT ION AL IDENTITY 
Of all collective identities, national identity is by far the one that has 
predominated in the past two centuries. A certain tradition of memory and 
history crystallized around the nation as a new hegemonic collective 
identity. The France of the Third Republic is the supreme example of the 
process of constructing a tradition of memory (Jes lieux de memoire) and a 
science of history that remained in the hands of professionals specialized in 
its study and convinced that they were employing the 'scientific method' 
and had the abili ty to convert documents into 'objective evidence' derived 
from the past. The use of that tradition of memory and science of history for 
political ends (to legitimize, unite, and perpetuate the nation-state) and the 
close link between it and nationalist ideology have been pointed out on 
numerous occasions. However, there are other aspecl<; of the relationship 
between politics, memory, and history that deserve to be taken into 
consideration and that arise only when the frame of reference is not the 
process of bnilding a strong hegemonic national identity at the prompting of 
the state, in the style of France, but the manifest weakness of the state when 
that objective has been achieved. 
Spain is different from other Mediterranean countries in a number of 
ways. The use of history has also played a fundamental political role here in 
ideological conflicts, especially in the conflict that arises from the 
construction of a 'state-centred ' national identity. At the heart of that 
process and with that conflict as a setling, memory and history have been 
used in an uncritical , simplistic way for purposes of ideological propaganda. 
In Spain as in France and Portugal, the modem stale goes back to a very 
early date, and therefore in the origins of this state both history and politics 
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were subordinated to the interests of certain social sectors and corporations 
with their particular privileges. The modern state arose in Spain, as in 
France and Portugal, long before the existence of a public sphere favourable 
for the exercise of politics as we understand it now or o f a specific 
professional environment for the cultivation of history. It was, therefore, a 
state that preceded nationalist ideology, a state that over several centuries 
acquired modern features which did not, however, include considering the 
imposition of a national identity. What is characteristic of Spain, however, 
is that the state sought to legitimize itself through an ideology, that of the 
Catholic empire, which, while not yet strictly nationalist, was later able to 
evolve towards a kind of nationalism that has left a Jong, deep mark on our 
contemporary history. 
Two further characteristics are provided by the fact that during the 
period of nationalisms Spain, in contrast to France, lacked a strong, 
incontrovertible national identity and a history to support it in a 
professional, 'scientific' way.• Throughout the twentieth century the weak 
establishment in Spain of that identity and that type of history was linked 
with the emergence of two kinds of conflict: conflict between various 
conceptions of Spanish national identity, which prevented the development 
of a hegemonic national consciousness, and conflict between those who 
supported a Spanish identity and those within the state who rejected that 
identity and defended the constructions of national identities other than the 
Spanish. These conflicting identities created their own images of the past 
and advocated different kinds of history. 
As a result, no strong hegemonic tradition of a nation-state variety of 
memory/history emerged in Spain. History that identifies nation with state 
and provides them with a common nation-state-centred identity recognized 
as belonging to them by most citizens - the 'classical' or ' traditional' 
history capable of forming or reinforcing a national consciousness that 
coincides with the territorial limits of the state - has had little social 
influence. Still Jess, lherefore, have there been the conditions necessary for 
using that memory/history to create a national critical history, the kind of 
history that Pierre Nora has proposed in France, starting from the concept 
of lieux de 111e111oire1 and seeking to adapt national history to the new 
scientific and civic needs of our time. The odd study on 'places of memory' 
can be found in Spain,8 but the country lacks a tradition capable of 
establishing iL'ielf in the academic world and in public opinion in such a way 
as either to maintain interest in a traditional kind of national history or to 
propose a new national history setting out from the alternative proposal of 
I ieux de memoi re. 
That there is no strong hegemonic tradition of a nation-state variety of 
memory/history in Spain at present can be verified in three ways. First, 
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during the past three decades the history of Spain has gradually been 
displaced by history concerned with subjects other than the nation-state 
such as stateless nations and regions (the 'autonomous communities ' ), 
small societies of a local nature (rural or urban). or social groups (social 
classes, professional groups, women). The recent reaction to this 
abandonment of the history of Spain is eloquent in this connection. Some 
recently published histories of Spain (those of Garcia de Cort:izar and 
Tusell)'' must be placed in this context, but their relati ve success in 
publishing terms must by no means be understood as a trend. Second, the 
recent 'debate on the humanities' has highlighted a profound d ivergence 
among the various public authorities with responsibilities fo r education 
(central government and autonomous governments), between public 
authorities and historians, and even among historians.10 This conflict, 
which has attracted public attention, is indicative of the current complete 
Jack of agreement about the kind of history that should be taught in 
Spain. 
Third, there is the polemic nurtured by the various party leaders and 
certain groups of intellectuals with a strong influence on public opinion -
because of their frequent appearances in the media - about whether the 
democratic state is authorized to promote a nationalization of collective 
memory and of history. The fact that there is discussion about whether such 
a nationalization makes sense nowadays and how it should be carried out 
(whether in favour of a predominantly Spanish national identi ty or of 
recognition of the various national identities on an equal footing, where the 
plurali ty of national entities should lead, and so on) shows a total lack of 
political consensus. On the one hand there are those who support 
reinforcing Spanish national identity and for that purpose recovering the 
history of Spain while at the same time promoting the nationalization of 
memory and history as classically conceived. On the other hand, there are 
those who reject the idea that the 'state of autonomous regions' should 
even consider such a possibility, since it would favour the cultural and 
political standardization characteristic of the past in the face of the 
tendency towards plurality and decentralization of our time. The former 
complain of the absence of a memory and history of the Spanish nation that 
might provide a solid basis for awareness of a common identity extending 
to all inhabitants of the state. The latter criticize the attempt to use history 
to legitimize state-centred nationalism and advocate the creation of new 
collective identities, both supranational (a united Europe) and subnational 
(cities, regions, former stateless nations). 
To use a musical metaphor borrowed from Jeffrey Olick,11 it seems as if, 
after a long period during which the /10111opho11y of the eschatology of the 
church persisted, only relatively recently to disappear, motlern Spain has 
r 
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fully enlered the pvlyto11ality of multiculturalism wilhout having known, 
other than briefly and always imperfectly and controversially, the pnlyphn11y 
of national state ownership.'! 
TWO POLITICALLY OPPOSED KINDS OF HISTORY 
The fact that Spain lacks a slrong, deeply rooted tradition of 
memory/history of the kind that we find in nation-states in the West is 
clearly due to a variety of factors that could equally account for the much 
discussed weakness of the nation/state in our country. 1J As far as the 
constitution of that tradition is directly concerned. in twentieth century 
Spain there were two almost opposite ways of representing the past and 
the process or path traced in it." Those two contlicling global views of our 
history were uourished by the clash between two ideologies that disputed 
political hegemouy throughout the nineteenth century and the better part 
of the twentieth. The deep ideological and political fracture of Spain that 
gave rise to those two traditions of historical memory goes back to the 
point when the a11cie11 regime went into a crisis and the liberal revolution 
made its appearance. Since then the conflict, sometimes latent and 
sometimes manifest in the form of successive civil wars, has been 
reproduced equally in the view of the past and in the use of history as a 
basis for national identities in the new state. Two opposed views of the 
history of Spain - one here called 'orthodox' because of its traditional 
nature and another in tune with liberal thinking - confronted one another 
without either managing to achieve clear dominion for most of the 
twentieth century. 
The 'orthodox' view has its roots in the religious and state-centred 
conception that emerged at the time of the Catholic empire, when the 
Spanish monarchy expanded in Europe and created a huge colonial empire 
in America. This conception of history had the implicit consent of the new 
state, which, despite its formally liberal nature, left primary education in the 
hands of the Catho lic Church. Later, during the twentieth century, 
'orthodox' history had the support of two dictatorships (the dictatorship of 
Primo de Rivera, between 1923 and 1930, and the dictatorship of Franco, 
betweeu 1939 and 1975, the latter with totalitarian pretensions), and it was 
very much present in schools until at least the 1960s. 
The 'orthodox' history of Spain is a simple Manichean account of 
historical events enacted by heroes and martyrs of the national/Catho lic 
cause. Without a break, the thread of that history links the prehistoric 
origins of the 'beloved country' (the moment when the Celtiberians, with 
their 'simple customs' and 'independent nature', brought about the 
emergence of the 'true Spanish race' ) to the ' miracle' of the introduction 
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of Christianity (thanks to St James the Apostle anJ the intervention of the 
Virgin of the Pillar), the constitution of the Yisigothic Catholic monarchy 
(which united the Peninsula for the first time), and the advance of the 
Reconquest during the Middle Ages (which finally succeeded in expelling 
the invaders who supported the ' false prophet MohammeJ'). Seen in this 
way, the history of Spain culminates in the glorious reign of the Catholic 
monarchs with the definitive religions and political unification of the 
country, the creation of the ' Holy Tribunal of the Inquisition', which 
succeeJed in preserving national/Catholic unity, anJ the 'discovery' of 
America, opening up the new continent to Hispanic evangelization. Later 
there is the pinnacle of the Christian empire during the reigns of Charles V 
and Philip II anJ the increasing decline as rulers moved away from the 
Jesigns of Ji vine providence, gave up the traditional spirituality promoted 
by the Catholic Church, and fell into the hands of 'materialistic and 
foreign' ideologies alien to the 'true nature' - spiritual and national - of the 
Spanish people. 
This interpretation of history, which set out to explain the greatness and 
decline of Spain in accordance with its adherence to church and monarchy, 
preserved a Jistinctly traditional, antimodern character derived from the old 
counter-Reformation iJeology from the time of the empire. With a few 
significant modifications it was able to adapt to the new middle-class 
society and (especially in the rural Spain that continued to predominate until 
the mid-nineteenth century) counteract the political advances of liberalism. 
Thanks to the predominant role of the Catholic Church in primary 
education, this kind of history was very much a part of the education of 
Spaniards until the last third of the twentieth century.1.1 
Later, the Franco regime used the national/Catholic view of the history 
of Spain and the tradition of memory that it provided (St James the 
Apostle, Covadonga and Pelayo, el Cid, the Catholic Monarchs, 
Hisp<midad) to legitimize a national/militarist ideology and a 
theocratic/charismatic conception of the state that was fitting ly 
personifie<l by the figure of the Caudillo or 'Leader' . The Caudillo, having 
won the war, thereby became the one chosen by divine providence to 
rescue Spain from its decline and lead it along the path to the imperial 
glory of bygone years. In this way, with the sole but important 
modification that militarist caudillismo introduced in occupying the 
position of the monarchy, vacant since the victory of the Second Republic, 
during Franco's era the history of Spain officially continued to correspond 
to the same divine plan that had long before been 'revealed' by 
national/Catholic ideology and historiography. 
According to this view of the past. the Spanish people, who had been 
chosen by divine provi<lence, constantly displayed a national character in 
POLITICAL USES OF HISTORY IN S PAIN 103 
harmony with the spiritual values of the Catholic Church, values of which 
the army, triumphant in the Civil War of 1936-39, was now the main 
guarantor. All this provided a basis for the indissoluble unity of Spain and 
gave meaning to the struggle against any kind of ' invasion, heresy, 
separatist tendency and pernicious lay ideology, anti-Spanish by nature', 
among which freemasonry, liberalism, and communism were prominent. 
When Spain had good rulers whose desire was not to imitate other nations 
but 'to maintain the virtues of the race' and 'to follow the designs of God', 
it attained its 'supreme imperial greatness' .1r. 
This religious fundamentalisl conception of the history of Spain 
obviously had an ideological basis with traditional, antimodem leanings that 
its promoters at no point sought to hide. With such an ideology there was 
little need for the research work of professional historians, work that at the 
beginning of the twentieth century was barely established academically in 
Spain. in contrast· to France or Germany, and that hardly began to be 
developed during the first third of that century. For the nutional/Catholic 
representation of the past to adorn itself with a certain intellectual air it was 
sufficient to refer to the work of prestigious Catholic philosophers of the 
nineteenth century such as Donoso Cortes y Balmes or to fall buck on the 
most reactionary ideas of the early Menendez y Pelayo. 
To combat such a view of the past it was not sufficient for a different 
kind of history to emerge in the ucademic world. It was undoubtedly 
important that in some classes in secondary education institutes and 
universities at the end of the nineteenth century a history appeared that was 
conceived as a positive science ready to dismantle reactionary myths and 
criticize the manipulation of the past. But challenging the traditional 
ideology required an alterm1tive global view, and for this purpose, in 
addition to the scientific conception of history, literature with a historicul 
content and especially the new literary genre of the historical novel proved 
enormously useful. 17 
The liberal Fiew of the history of Spain was much more in accord with 
the modern nationalist spirit lhat was developing in the more advanced 
states in Europe, but it was limited with regard to its development in 
universities and its diffusion in society. Following the lines of liberal 
ideology, the course of history now became a permanent setting for 1he 
struggle of the Spanish people against political or religious tyranny. 
Without relinquishing the idea of the very ancient origins of the Spanish 
nation, liberal criticism focused on the end of the Visigothic monarchy 
(because it was a theocratic one) and the times of religious intolerance, 
especially during lhe era of Philip II. The Middle Ages were positively 
evaluatel.I in terms of the limitations on monarchic power imposed by the 
Spanish parliament and municipalities in the Christian kingdoms and the 
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religious tolerance lhat, despile the war, existed on both sides during the 
Reconquest. The particular characterisiic of Spain, it was even said, was 
the coexistence of Christians, Moors, and Jews in the Midtlle Ages, 
despite the conflicts that it caused. In modern times there was a special 
attraction in attempts to set limits to authoritarian power, as happened 
during the revolts of the Co111111iidades in Castile and the Germanfas in 
Valencia. The enlighte ned reformism of Charles HI 's reign, in the mitl-
eighteenth century, was presented as the heginning of a truly Spanish 
revolntion, subsequently cut short hy the shameful reign of Charles IV and 
the Napoleonic invasion. 
After a nineteenth century o f constant civil wars and conflicts that 
prevented the occurrence of the revolution that the country needed. a new 
stage seemed to commence at the start of the twentieth century with 
prospects of the 'regeneration' of Spain. T he material and intellectual 
progress of the Spanish people depended on the success of that 
revolution, which quite clearly was to be one promoted from above anti 
aitletl by the enlightened classes, thus avoiding the violent outbreak of 
mass tliscontenl that was perceived as an imminent danger. This view of 
history was bound up with a plan of transformation that set its sight on 
motlern developed Europe and considered the oltl traditional Spain, the 
Spain that officially professed to he Catholic, an encumbrance from the 
past. Similarly, in the opinion of the more advanced liberals, political 
unity could be preservetl only by the concession of a greater tlegree of 
freedom, so that the different peoples of which Spain consisted could be 
provided with thei r own governments (either from a radical perspective, 
disposed lo refound the state, as defentled by republican federalists with 
scant success, or else from a tlifferenl perspective, much more motlerate 
in tone anti autonomist and regionalist in style). It was a further lesson 
providetl by the liberal , lay, progressive histo ry that in different periotls 
of our development a common popular democratic demantl for 
decentralization and self-government resisted the repression exercised by 
authoritarian powers. 
This liberal, nationalist conception of the history of Spain, contrasting 
with the tradition of memory promoted by the national-Catholic view, had 
its moment of victory, albeit short-lived, tluring the Second Republic (in the 
historiographic renovation whose most outstantling figure was Rafael 
Altamira).'" Subsequently, from 1939 onwards, it had to seek refuge in exile 
or in secrecy as the winners of the war imposetl an almost complete 
disregard of those ideas until Franco's dictatorship began to tolerate a 
certain sort of dissitlence in the late 1950s. 
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In the final stage of the dictatorship the out-and-out supporters of the Franco 
regime continueu, with more or less scholarly rigour according lo their level 
of education and intellectual stature, to defend a trauitional, 'orthodox' 
history of Spain. repeating the clicht!s of liispanidad and identification with 
Catholicism, the unity of the nation since remote times. the Christian empire 
that had been succeeded by a decline due to bad rulers, and criticism of the 
enlightened reformism, liberalism, anti socialism that had been imported 
from abroad. In addition to all this there was now a special interest in the 
figure of Ferdinand VU, the king who, between 1815 and 1833, sought to 
preserve the traditional order characteristic of the a11cie11 regime and 
introduce certain economic reforms. After his death, which some saw as a 
forewarning of what would happen when Franco disappeared. the crisis of 
the a11ci e11 regime - according to this reactionary view of our history - gave 
way to a chaotic nineteenth century of interminable fratricidal fights with no 
strong power capable of containing them, an image of the imminent disaster 
foreseen by those who supported the dictatorship at all costs. Those who 
opposed the regime, in contrast within a very broad ideological spectrum, 
resisted the image of a Spain historically incapable of freedom and 
democracy and the idea of a Spanish character inherently opposed to the 
modern values prevail ing in Europe. 
It is not a question here of analysing in detail how the traditional view 
of the history of Spain lost credibility and the capacity for political 
legitimation in the final years of Franco's dictatorship. Various factors 
coutri buted, among them (a) the social effects of the accelerated 
industrialization and urbanization of the I 960s; (b) the changes that took 
place within the Catholic Church as a result of the Second Vatican Council; 
(c) the opening up to Europe that the dictatorship allowed with a view to its 
own perpetuation: (d) the work of a generation of new historians in Spain 
who undertook the task of demolishing the official orthodoxy and provided 
a totally different interpretation, from a liberal perspective but adopting the 
new economic and social history that prevailed in Europe at the time; and 
(e) access to secondary and university education for an ever greater 
proportion of the population. All of these things helped to weaken a strongly 
ideologizetl representation of the past, the simple Manichean view of our 
history described as 'orthodox' which, during much of the twentieth 
century, shaped the mentality of a large number of Spaniards. Nowadays 
this view of the past is so remote and foreign that it is almost a curiosity: 
hence its appeal for readers or audiences when it is shown to us in books, 
films, or plays abont those times. 1" However, mentalities and altitudes 
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shape<l by this 'orthodox' view of the history of Spain are still much more 
prevalent in Spain than is generally believed. 
As society became industrialized during the 1960s and an increasing 
number of young people gained access to secondary and higher education 
in Spain, history began to develop as a discipline in our universities, as had 
happened in other nearby countries long before. At the time, <luring the 
1960s and early 1970s , that is to say, at the height of the struggle against 
the dictatorship, that development did not exclude poli tical commitment on 
the part of some historians. A fai r number of them made this quite clear 
without there being any effect on the quality of the research that they 
conducted. Thanks to the impressive advance that took place in historical 
research during those two decades, it was possible to write the history of 
Spain from a perspective previously unknown and in a totally new way, less 
national and Spanish-centred, broader and more varied than had been 
imagined by classical liberal progressivism, and without the old organicist 
essentialism that had previously permeated the liberal view of the past.:u 
The history subsequently produced in Spain took its place full y within 
the framework of renovation, sharing its multiplication of subjects of 
investigation, exploration of new sources, and use of new methods which in 
general terms led to a division of historiography into separate 
subdisciplines. The absence of great debates was the most striking feature 
in the case of Spain, accompanied by an accumulation of publications about 
the most diverse topics but without major works of synthesis such as those 
that had appeared at the beginning of the process of transformation. The 
new 'state of autonomies' favonred a separate history for each of the regions 
or nationalities that constituted Spain. For these and other reasons, the 
victory of democracy did not resolve the old conflict between the two 
nationalist ideologies and their respective views of the past in favour of the 
constitu tion of a single tradition of Spanish national memory/history. On the 
contrary, democracy made the disagreement even plainer. 
Nevertheless, in a political context that changed radically as the 
transition to democracy took place, general views about the history of Spain 
underwent very significant modifications. In the early stages of the 
historiogruphic renovation, during the 1950s and 1960s, the period that 
aroused the interest of historians was the time of transition from the m1cie11 
regime to modern contemporary society. At the same time, those who were 
fond of the medieval era or felt nostalgia for imperial Spain received the 
criticism of unofficial historiography, which ultimately transmitted an 
image of a history of Spain little different from that of buêoéÉKú N=Comparison 
with what was considered characteristic of the recent history of the 
democratic countries of the West did, however, reveal one feature specific 
to the development of Spain: the lack of dynamism in everything connected 
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with social change. There had been no revolution of an intensity similar lo 
that of the one that took place in France or other parts of Europe but instead 
a change of a political nature in a timidly liberal direction. The ultimate 
reason, it was thought then, was the country's economic backwardness and 
the absence of a middle class that was a natural consequence of that 
backwardness. By contrast with the more advanced countries of Europe, 
which experienced industrialization and the rise of an enterprising middle 
class, the Spain of the nineteenth century was characterized by the dominion 
of the oltl nobility and by a society anti a dual economy in which sector and 
class features of an incomplete transition coexisted. The economic, 
political, and ideological weakness of the middle classes contrasted with the 
prestige and social power of blue-blooded aristocrats, large landowners, and 
leaders in the area of finance. The oligarchical power bloc that was created 
in the nineteenth century, after a liberal revolution that had left intact the 
economic foundations of the power of the old aristocracy. had thus proved 
to be a hindrance to economic development and evolution towards 
democracy. 
Onto this image. which had many points in common with liberal 
historiography prior to the victory of Franco's dictatorship. two Jci nds of 
influences were superimposed in the 1970s during the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy - influences that in the end modified it without 
going so far as to question it. The first was explicitly Marxist in orientation, 
but it would be false to attribute to it the economicism anti dogmatism of the 
political ideology that inspired it. Allhough there was and still is that kind 
of Marxism in Spanish historiography. one of the few debates to have 
attained a certain importance in Spain - whether there had been a 'middle-
class revolution' c.luring the nineteenth century - revealed not one but 
several ways of conceiving Marxism to explain the history of Spain, some 
of which were so 'heterodox' that they anticipated conclusions about the 
revolutionary process later judged to be 'revisionist' in the rest of Europe. 
The second influence, evident since the 1970s, came from the 'new 
economic history' and the 'new political history' that began to develop as 
an allernative to the influence of Marxism. Both initially put the accent on 
the obstacles lo modernization in the course of the nineteenth anti twentieth 
centuries. 
PO LITICS AND HISTORY IN T HE 1990s 
Gradually, what bad been a view of history dominatec.I by the idea of Spain's 
economic and political backwardness acquired a completely different 
significance. During most of the twentieth century the awareness of this 
backwarc.lness by comparison with the development of the other democratic 
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states of Western Europe had led to an emphasis on two disasters, the loss 
of the last remains of the American empire in 1898 and the Civil War of 
1936-39, which brought out the magnitude of the catastrophe and 'Spain's 
foilure ·. For a long time these two events created a sense of shock in the 
historical and political consciousness of Spaniards. If only because of the 
lack of a democratic regime, the political situation in the final period of the 
dictatorship and the beginning of the negotiated transition seemed to justify 
the hypercritical attitude of historians towards our past. Once democracy 
began to consolidate, however, a different image of the history of Spain 
began to win supporters. This image increasingly emphasized its similarity 
to the path followed by the more advanced countries in Europe and played 
down the importance of the ' failures' mentioned. In the past decade a good 
many historians have gradually begun to question the classic theses of 
progressive historiography (liberal-nationalist, either economic and social 
or Marxist-influenced) and instead to stress the image of a 'normal' 
historical development that could not be perceived until now, either inside 
or outside the country, for fundamentally ideological reasons.!! 
The fact that the commemorations enthusiastically supported by the 
governments of one political tendency or another have openly profited from 
this new paradigm which insists on the normality of our history should 
nevertheless have put the revisionist historians - so critical of the ideologies 
of the past - on their guard. The first of the commemorations that clearly 
drew political advantage from the results of the current revisionism was tbe 
one that took place in 1988, on the occasion of the bicentenary of the death 
of Charles Ill. Both the monarchy and the enlightened ministers who 
governed in that period with the monarchy's consent were presented as 
agents of the modernization of the country considerably before the outbreak 
of the French Revolution. They thus hecame an encouraging antecedent for 
the current democratic monarchy of King Juan Carlos I and the third course 
followed by the Socialist government, showing its equidistance from the old 
revolutionary aspirations of the classical left and the extreme conservatism 
of the right that has almost always governed Spain. As a timely 
complement, in 1992 the quincentenary of the 'discovery' of America 
brought, in the words of the historian Jose Marfa Jover, 'a kind of veneer of 
universality enhancing the recent glad tidings that henceforth we were to be 
Europeans and that the years of isolation after the Civil War were gone for 
good' .!J Very shortly before, the Socialist government - an enthusiastic 
promoter of both commemorations - had succeeded in making Spain a full 
member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, going against what had 
previously been the political posture of the party that sustained it. 
In the final yenrs of the Socialist period, bowever, there was a surprising 
change. Suddenly a mood of crisis and mistrust set in. with a great wave of 
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accusations of corruption involving people close to Felipe Gonz{tlez's 
government. This mood placed a question mark over the optimistic image 
of Spain 's historical nom1ality, and there was a revival of the old doom-
laden view of a corrupt Spain in which, under the cloak of poli tics, caciques 
and clienteles proliferated. The economic and financial scandals and the 
discovery of the political conspiracy of the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de 
Liberaci6 n) (an antiterrorist group that had exercised violence against the 
circles of the Basque separatist ETA wi th the complicity even of certain 
officials of the Ministry of the Interior) indicated the inheritance of a system 
that had survived from the dictatorship as a result of concessions to the past 
made during the transition. 
Jn this context, in 1994 the best-selling history book Brel'e his1oria de 
Esp01ia, by Fernando Garcfa de Cortazar and Jose Manuel Gonzalez Vesga, 
put forward the i<lea of an 'unfinished Spain', constantly passing through 
areas of light and shade along its path. After experiencing an exemplary 
transi tion to democracy during the governments of Adolfo Suarez anti the 
first Socialist era, Spain was by then in full recession, with a government 
that was exercising a monopoly of control of public institutions or acting as 
a ' front for the phenomena of corruption that mark the end of the third 
Socialist legislature', ·an indus try dismantled by competition from 
European products, a disoriented agriculture and the unstoppable g rowth of 
unemployment', 'a materialistic society devoid of utopias' and 'the 
ra<licalization of the 11a1io11alis1 movements' .2' 
This panorama, which suddenly had become so contrary to the 
exaggerated optimism of n few years earlier, was described in such 
apocalyptic tones that it was possible lo see through it to the political 
purpose of the accusation. In addition to the discrediting of Felipe Gonzalez, 
who had headed the government for too long and was by then suspected of 
seeking to perpetuate himself at the cost of Spain's interests, democracy was 
identified wi th an alternation of power in favour of a party - the Popular 
Party - that came from the tradi tional right and needed to occupy the 
political centre, until then in the hands of the Socialists, in order to win the 
election. While the Socialists remained immersed in impotence, incapable 
of cleansing their image by means of a self-criticism that might restore their 
credibility and bring about the replacement of their lenders, the Popular 
Party put together a skilful strategy that brought it to power in 1996. 
After the change of government, with the same speed as before but this 
time in the opposite direction, the doom-laden tones were suspiciously 
replaced by a view tbat revived the encouraging normali ty of a historical 
course about to culminate in Spain's full integration into the new united 
Europe. The use of historiographic revisionism has been evident in the 
anniversaries enthusiastically supported by the Popular Party government. 
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Thus the 'disaster' of a century ago (the 'crisis of 1898 ') ended up being 
presented as an exaggeration on the part of intellectuals steeped in 
radicalism and demagoguery, unable to understand the extent to which, 
thanks to the efforts of the Liberal politicians of the time, Spain was then 
following the course of economic modernization and politics pursued by 
countries of the Western woêldKDú=Far from being a historical rarity in our 
country, liberalism had a long tradition of modest successes back at least as 
far as the Restoration years under Canovas. At the same time, Canovas was 
rehabilitated as a true statesman who had been attacked by extremists of 
both tendencies. His regime. contrary to progressive or Marxist 
historiography, was declared to have had very positive effects. It had been 
able to put a stop to militarism for a long period, establish a system for the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms equivalent to those of the most advanced 
countries in Europe, and create a climate of social peace that made possible 
the deve lopment of the Spanish economy. In the context of this kind of 
historiographic revisionism, highly favourable to the achievements of the 
Restoration regime but as exaggeratedly partial as the earlier scathing 
criticism, it is not surprising that the Popular Party took advantage of 
Ctinovas's centenary to convert him into the great precursor of their 
policies.'6 It had been much harder for the Conservative leader Manuel 
Fraga Iribarne when he championed Canovas, at a time when revisionist 
history did not yet exist and the predominant view was of a backward Spain 
in the hands of ol igarchs and caciques. 
Finally, the pretext of the quarter-centenary of the death of Philip II 
offered a further opportunity to use history for political ends, with a Spanish 
nationalist smugness that succeeded in wounding the sensibilities of 
Portuguese neighbours at Expo 98 in Lisbon. The supposed universality of 
which Jover spoke to us in connection with the quincentenary of the 
'discovery' of America was now reinforced by a staging interested only in 
highlighting the splendour of a reign full of brilliance in the spheres of art 
and culture."1 Seen in this light, Philip II was a prince of the Renaissance 
willing to govern a gre:.it 'confederation of territories' with wisdom and 
humanity - a king, according to the historian Henry Kamen, who pursued 
' universal pleasures and interests' although ' imbued with a deep religiosity 
like most rulers of the time'." The book by this scholar of Spanish affairs, 
Philip of Spain, has also been a best-seller,'" and, as Antonio Elorza rightly 
foresaw, it set the pattern for ' the commemorative image of the great king 
who inspired the name of the current heir to the Spanish throne' KJúá= This 
desire on the part of our current rulers to display the most brilliant, 
normalized, acceptable part of our p:.ist - art, science, universalism - from a 
European perspective, setting aside social manifestations that have become 
less presentable and the conflicts that fonnerly marked us, now appears with 
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very suspicious self-salisfied reileration. This happened once again in 
connection wilh the crisis of I 89&J• and has been repealed in exhibitions 
such as the one recently organized by the Valencian Aulonomous 
Government and the Archbishopric of Valencia on ' the important part 
played by the Church in the historical development of the Yalencian 
Communily and the wealth of an artistic and cultural legacy thal is lo a large 
extent unknown '.n The title of the exhibition, 'The Light of Images', is 
highly illustrative; the darker areas, evidently, do not deserve to be 
remembered. 
The current historiographic revisionism also has other political uses that 
are more worrying because of the intention lhat they reveal. Until very 
recently - in due correspondence with the optimism promoted by the current 
conjuncture of democratic stability and economic success, which, as we have 
seen, has modified our image of the past and lifted it out of its obsession with 
backwardness and decline - a veil of oblivion and caution had been drawn 
over our more recent history. Timely reference to lhis is made in Paloma 
Aguilar Femandez's book Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil espaiiola,·u 
and this situation, which, as we have seen, at the time worked in favour of the 
reconciliation of Spaniards, could now have effects that might run counter to 
the establishment of democratic values. The demythologizing of the 
Republican side that is beginning to appear in histo rical research is clearly not 
the problem. Part of the work of historians constantly to revise what has been 
written about the past and to highlight any kind of ideological influence on 
the different ways of studying a historical event. The problem is the one-
sided, tendentious way in which the results of this research are being 
presented to a hroad public and the unusual interest aroused by these studies, 
especially when they are concerned with combating the image of those who 
fought on the Republican side during the 1936-39 war (this is the case with 
the International Brigades, lo give one example) or covertly seeking a partial 
rehabilitation of Franco's regime and of his person - in the final analysis, a 
pioneer in the victorious struggle against revolutionary socialism, as 
subsequently one of his admirers in Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, would 
also appear to have been. The defeat of communism and the success of 
modernization in our country thus seem lo be connected with a ' really not 
very fascist' regime, supposedly with an authoritarian ideology that was not 
particularly firm and consequently was capable of admitting internal 
dissidence which later made possible the pact leading to democracy. Such a 
fa lsification of history, as some historians have recently charged, overlooks 
the degree to whicb Franco's dictatorship was radically antiliberal, lhe extent 
to which it repressed democrats of all kinds, and the way in which, until the 
very end, it hung on to its desire to be perpetuated, something that proved 
impossible as Spanish society developed and became integrated into E urope. 
112 MEDITERRANEAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 
Finally, in contrast lo the situation during the years of struggle aguinsl 
the dictatorship, the idea of highlighting the diverse, plural reality of our 
country and at lhe same time pointing to its a common history seems to have 
little support. Works of synthesis offering a history of the 'uutonomous 
communities' provoke an angry reaction from advocates of a single history 
of the 'Spanish nation', who see the former approach as propitiating 
nationalist separatisms or becoming locked in Jocalism. The debate has 
extended into the area or the education of children und adolescents and the 
question of what kinds of history should be taught nowadays.-" Criticizing 
and demythologizing any kind of use of history for nationalist ends does not 
seem to have been defended consistently by a good many of the participants 
in this debate. This, at least, is the situation when the very individuals who 
present timely, well grounded criticism of Spanish historiographic 
nationalism nevertheless defend a nationalist history in the case of 
Catalonia (or the Catalan Lands), Euskal Herria, or Galicia. And the sume 
could be said of those who are in favour of dismantling myths about origins 
and nationalist manipulations of history when it is a question of these other 
nationalisms but who are none too willing to detach themselves from the 
idea of a Spanish national development basically identified with the history 
of the predominance of one society, one language and one culture (Castile). 
Three examples may serve to illustrate this: the controversy in Catalonia 
about the development of its historiography," the recent debate about the 
teaching of the humanities already mentioned (and the conception of the 
current Ministry of Culture and Education, the historians who have advised 
it, and the intellecLUals who have applauded it, not exactly of right-wing 
origin), and the recent award of a national essay prize lo the collective book 
Elser de Espaiia."' No doubt we should connect all this with the current 
debate about whether there is a need to reform the democratic Constitution 
of 1978 in the context of the demands for a greater degree of self-
government put forward by peripheral nationalisms. 
As stated at the outset, history has an important political part to play in the 
current situation. The special feature of Spain among the Medite1rnnean 
countries in connection with the political uses of the past is apparent, broadly 
speaking, in a developmeut bounded by two .fi11-de-siecle crises of very 
different kinds. A hundred years ago, the disaster represented by the Joss of 
the last remnants of the colonial empire was evident to all. From that crisis a 
kind of 'regenerationist' nationalism emerged that advocated replacing the old 
stale of notables or oligarchs characteristic of a backward agrarian society 
with a different, more modern one supported by new social groups. The 
current crisis, however, must be set in a totally different social and political 
context. Its cause is not industrialization or any colonial disaster or general 
sense of backwardness in re lation to other countries. The statement 'Spain is 
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doing well', made by the Prime Minister, Jose Marla Aznar, immediately after 
coming to power in 1996, reveals the inordinate optimism that invades the 
country now, contrasting with the equally exaggerated pessimism of a century 
ago. If there is a crisis in Spain today it is certainly for other reasons, 
especially the awareness that the globalization to which Spain is lending is 
numbering the days of the nation-state just as it is in other parts of Europe. 
In another context, therefore, very different from that of a century ago, in 
Spain too the various groups that dispute hegemony have linked their 
respective political projects to conflicting views of the past. Al first sight it 
would seem that we are faced with a new edition of the old, intem1inable 
debate about the 'problem of Spain' ;11 first put forward during the crisis ut 
the end of the nineteenth century. However, the area of the debate is utterly 
different. Whercus 100 years ago the 'problem of Spain' arose from an 
awareness that its history was one that included numerous failures and an 
extraordinury decline, now the immediate future of a united Europe, in which 
for some years Spain has been playing a leading role, is tending to erase 
differences and highlight similarities in a development in which only 
successes are of interest. In this new European context, those who consider 
Spain's existence as a nation unchallengeable are advocates of a history that 
reinforces the collective feeling of belonging to that ·incontrovertible 
reality'. For those who think that Spain as a collective entity must gradually 
give way to other identities, in contrast, recourse to history serves to 
legitimize olher political options that may favour the maximum autonomy or 
even independence of hitherto stateless nations in the not too distant future. 
However, anyone who thinks that the current debate will in future take 
place on the same intellectual horizon as in the pust is mistaken. Although a 
revival of conflict between nationalist ideologies appealing to history remains 
very likely, the fact is that in the new era that we are entering the crisis of 
national identities classically conceived - with or without a stale - is 
becoming increasingly apparent. Internal cultural homogenization and the 
exclusion of those who do not share the features of an identity that, after all, 
can always be reinvented are becoming increasingly meaningless. Our world 
is tending towards multiculturalism, and the coexistence and superimposition 
of multifarious identities capable of resolving conflicts by means of dialogue 
and communication make it necessary to think about a new political use of 
history. This new use will be sorely needed lo provide an impulse for the 
future development of societies that will increasingly be experiencing both 
globalization and internal di fferentiation. If historians take refuge in scientific 
asepsis at this crucinl moment, others will go on using history to legitimize 
old powers and ir:npose identities that will perpetuate the cun-ent conflicts. 
Translated by Karel Clapslw11· 
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